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edge of the same.16 The rule in Maryland that a grantee
is bound by express encumbrances on his property which
could be found by use of the grantor-grantee index of the
land records, even though appearing in deeds not in the
direct chain of title, is a harsh one. 7 However, the practice
of subjecting the entire tract to restrictions by means of
a straw man conveyance eliminates the harshness of such
a rule, for each purchaser will discover the restrictions in
his direct chain of title. Although this practice may in-
volve many problems, as shown above, it does serve the
purpose of conclusively satisfying the requirement of con-
structive notice.
HOWARD J. NEEDLE
Partnership Realty And Its Treatment Under The
Uniform Partnership Act
Vlamis v. De Weese'
In 1921 Malin bought certain real property in Elkton
and erected a building thereon. In 1921 he conveyed a half
interest in said property to Deibert as a tenant in common,
and the two parties thereafter held the property and oper-
ated the premises as a garage and new car dealership.
Deibert died late in 1922 and left all his property, personal
and real, to his wife for life, remainder to his daughter.
Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 A. 216 (1915) ; Coomes v. Aero Theatre
Etc., 207 Md. 432, 114 A. 2d 631 (1955); King v. Walgand, 208 Md. 308,
311, 117 A, 2d 918 (1955) ; Easton v. The Careybrook Co., 210 Md. 286, 123
A. 2d 342 (1956) ; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) §863.
1"Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 A. 216 (1915). The case of Turner
v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336, 356, 111 A. 2d 855 (1955), noted 16 Md. L. Rev.
51 (1956), extended this rule to the effect that it raises the implication
that 'the common grantor intended to restrict the entire development, as-
suming the existence of a general plan. This, it is felt, places an unreason-
able burden upon title searchers, especially in Baltimore City. It Is to
be noted that in the counties of Maryland the grantor-grantee index re-
cording system is employed, which clearly discloses 'the earlier convey-
ances by the common grantor of the other lots in the subdivision which
do contain express restrictions. Even then it is a considerable burden to
a title searcher to require him to search for restrictions in all other con-
veyances from -the common grantor in the subdivision, In order to make an
accurate title report. But in Baltimore City the block index recording
system is employed, which would make it extremely difficult for a title
searcher to ever discover conveyances to all of the other lots in a large
subdivision. How would he find conveyances to lots across the street or
in an adjoining block? It would be necessary for him to search his title
by the grantor-grantee method, reading restrictions in 'all the deeds from
the common grantor. Should the common grantor 'be a land developer, the
title searcher would clearly be faced with an intolerable burden.
1216 Md. 384, 140 A. 2d 665 (1958).
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Malin continued to operate the firm business until 1931,
when Deibert's widow and her sister as executrices, and
Mrs. Deibert individually, executed a release of all their
interest in the property for consideration of $5,000 and
assumption of all firm liabilities by Malin. Malin died in
1946 and his son as devisee sold the property to appellant
Vlamis who in turn conveyed to appellant Freng, who
executed a purchase money mortgage to appellant Elkton
Banking and Trust Company. In 1957, Deibert's daughter,
for the first time aware that she might have an interest in
the garage and property, brought this suit in ejectment
contending that an undivided half interest in the partner-
ship realty passed to her as remainderman under the will
of her father.
Reversing a trial court holding, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the realty in question was definitely partnership
property of the firm of "Malin and Deibert", and that as
such it was treated as personalty under the Uniform Part-
nership Act.2 Accordingly, it had not passed as realty under
Deibert's will, but to the personal representatives of his
estate, who had transferred it to the surviving partner in
1931. 3
Before the adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act,
the courts were slow to recognize the partnership as a legal
entity and partnerships could not take property in a firm
or artificial name. A transfer to the partnership was re-
garded as being to the partners as tenants in common.4
Upon the death of one partner, the surviving partner could
prevail upon a court of equity to treat the real estate as
personalty for the purpose of winding up the business and
paying firm debts. This process was called "equitable con-
version".5 The problem then arose as to whether the excess
above what was needed to wind up the firm's affairs passed
as personalty or realty. The English cases adopted the
theory of "out and out conversion" whereby the real estate,
upon the death of a partner, becomes personalty for all
'6 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 73A, § 26:
"(Nature of Partner's Interest in the Partnership.) - A partner's
interest in the partnership is his share of the profits and surplus, and
the same is personal property."
12 AmlRIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY (1952) 44, § 6.9.
'Williams v. Dovell, 202 Md. 351, 354, 96 A. 2d 484 (1953) ; CRANE, PART-
NERSHIP (2nd ed. 1952) 189, § 38. This is no longer true under the Uniform
Partnership Act, 6 MD, CorE (1957) Art. 73A, § 8(3).
537 L.R.A. (N.S.) 900; Fooks v. Williams, 120 Md. 436, 443, 87 A. 692
(1913) ; CRANE, op. cit. supra n. 4, 218, § 45; 15 WORDS AND PHRAsEs, Equi-
table Conversion, 41.
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purposes.' Some American courts adopted the English
rule7 but the great weight of authority at common law was
that only so much of the proceeds of real estate as were
needed to wind up the business affairs and pay firm debts
were converted to personalty, and that the excess passed to
the heirs and devisees of the deceased partner as real prop-
erty.' This is known as the "pro tanto" theory of equitable
conversion and was the rule adopted by the Maryland courts
prior to the enactment of the Uniform Partnership Act in
1916. 9
The subject case, however, clearly and decisively
changes the common law rule of pro tanto conversion in
Maryland and states emphatically that in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary, Section 25 of the Uniform Part-
nership Act is, in effect, a codification of the English rule
set out in the previous paragraph. 10
The Court of Appeals in the subject case cites with ap-
proval the Maryland case of Williams v. Dovell" which
was decided in 1953. The Williams case discussed Sections
25 and 26 of the Uniform Partnership Act and stated that
its effect was, in the absence of an intent to the contrary,
to change the common law and treat real property as per-
sonalty for all purposes. However, the court found that
the partners in the Williams case intended to be treated as
tenants in common and the court gave effect to that in-
tention in holding that the property in question passed as
real property to the heir of the deceased partner. Thus
while the Williams case did correctly state the law under
the Uniform Partnership Act, the subject case is the first
in Maryland to decide that the property in question did
not pass as real property, but as personalty under Sections
25 and 26 of the act. It differs from the Williams case on
its facts, but the cases are in accord as to the effect of the
Uniform Partnership Act on partnership property. The
partner's interest in the partnership is his right to share
in the profits and surplus, which is personal property and a
mere chose in action, and is not subject to dower, curtesy
or allowances to widows, heirs or next of kin.'2 Each partner
0 CRANE, op. cit. supra n. 4, 219, § 45; 68 C.J.S. 512, Partnership, fn. 59.
7Miller v. Ferguson, 107 Va. 249, 57 S.E. 649 (1907).
8 68 C.J.S. 512, 'Partnership, § 73; 25 A.L.R. 389.
0 Goodburn v. Stevens, 5 Gill 1, 27 (Md. 1847) ; Fooks v. Williams, 120
Md. 436, 443, 87 A. 692 (1913). Note that this latter case was decided
three years prior to the adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act in
Maryland.
20216 Md. 384, 394-5, 140 A. 2d 665 (1958).
n 202 Md. 351, 96 A. 2d 484 (1953).
26 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 73A, §§ 25, 26.
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upon dissolution of the partnership, may have the partner-
ship property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the
surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount owing the
respective partners.13 Also it has been held in Illinois that
under the Uniform Partnership Act the surviving partner
has a right to sell and convey, and distribute the proceeds
without the aid of equity. 4
The effect of the De Weese case in interpreting the Uni-
form Partnership Act, is to clear up any confusion that
might previously have existed in this State. Under the
Act a firm may purchase partnership realty in the firm
name, and the laws which govern the powers and liabilities
of partners in their relations with each other and with third
parties as to personal property apply to such realty. In
other words, on the death of a partner, partnership realty
is treated as personalty for all purposes unless the partners
intended otherwise.
RussELL W. SHIPLEY
Revival Of Corporation Terminates Agent's Liability
On Post Forfeiture Contract
Marsh Furniture Company v. Solomon'
The charter of a Maryland corporation was forfeited
in 1955, pursuant to Article 81, Section 204,2 for nonpay-
ment of its 1955 franchise tax, although the State Tax Com-
mission accepted the corporation's payment of its 1956 and
1957 taxes. In July, 1957 defendant president of the cor-
poration, claiming to have no knowledge of the forfeiture
and believing the corporation to have capacity to contract,
created a debt to the plaintiff in the name of the corporation
"Ibid, § 38(1).
"Wharf v. Wharf, 306 Il. 79, 137 N.E. 446 (1922).
'The Daily Record, Dec. 4. 1958 (Balto. City Court, Md. 1958).
2 7 MD. CoDE (1957) Art. 81, §204 which states:
"(a) ... If any domestic corporation shall refuse or neglect to pay
to the State, or the proper officers thereof, any franchise tax, any
gross receipts tax, or any other State tax due by it .... or If any do-
mestic corporation shall refuse or neglect to file an annual report with
the State Tax Commission . . . it shall be the duty of the Comptroller
of the State to certify immediately thereafter to the Governor a list
of kall such corporations . . . and the Governor shall forthwith issue
and publish his proclamation declaring under this section that the
charters of such corporations shall be repealed, annulled and forfeited,
and that the powers conferred by law upon such corporations shall
,be inoperative, null and void, upon the date of the first publication
of such proclamation, without the necessity of proceedings of any kind
either at law or in equity."
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